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Abstract. Assurance of information flow security by formal methods is man-
dated in security certification of separation kernels. As an industrial standard for
separation kernels, ARINC 653 has been complied with by mainstream separation
kernels. Security of functionalities defined in ARINC 653 is thus very important
for the development and certification of separation kernels. This paper presents
the first effort to formally specify and verify separation kernels with ARINC 653
channel-based communication. We provide a reusable formal specification and
security proofs for separation kernels in Isabelle/HOL. During reasoning about
information flow security, we find some security flaws in the ARINC 653 stan-
dard, which can cause information leakage, and fix them in our specification. We
also validate the existence of the security flaws in two open-source ARINC 653
compliant separation kernels.
1 Introduction
Separation kernels [26] create a secure environment by providing temporal and spatial
separation of applications and ensure that there are no unintended channels for infor-
mation flows between partitions other than those explicitly provided. Separation kernels
decouple the verification of applications in partitions from the verification of the ker-
nels themselves. They are often sufficiently small and straightforward to allow formal
verification of their correctness. Assurance of information flow security [28] by formal
methods is mandated in Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [21] and certify-
ing separation kernels to highest Common Criteria evaluation levels (EAL 6 or 7) is
always accomplished by formally verifying information flow security.
Traditionally, security and safety of critical systems are assured and certified by
using two kinds of separation kernels respectively, such as VxWorks 653 [3] for safety-
critical systems and VxWorks MILS [4] for security-critical systems. A trend in this
field is to integrate safe and secure functionalities into one separation kernel. For in-
stance, PikeOS [2], LynxSecure [1] and open-source XtratuM [16] are designed to sup-
port both safety critical and security critical solutions. As an industrial standard for
safety-critical separation kernels, ARINC 653 [5] aims at improving safety and certifi-
cation process of safety-critical systems, which has been complied with by the main-
stream separation kernels such as PikeOS, VxWorks 653 and XtratuM. Therefore, in
order to develop ARINC 653 compliant secure separation kernels, it is necessary to
assure security of the functionalities defined in ARINC 653. A security verified spec-
ification and its mechanically checked proofs of ARINC 653 are significant for the
development and certification of separation kernels.
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2In separation kernels, Inter-Partition Communication (IPC) is a major mechanism
to implement controlled information flows, but if the mechanism is not well designed,
IPC can also contain covert channels [18] to leak information between applications.
ARINC 653 defines the functionalities and services of a channel-based communica-
tion mechanism for IPC. Although formal specification [8,30,31,32] and verification
[13,25,33,12,19,9,29] of information flow security on separation kernels have been
widely studied in academia and industry, information flow security of separation ker-
nels with ARINC 653 channel-based communication has not been studied to date. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first effort on this topic.
In this paper, we present a formal specification and its security proofs3 of separation
kernels with ARINC 653 channel-based communication in Isabelle/HOL [22]. In detail,
the technical contributions of this work are as follows.
1. We provide a mechanically checked formal specification which comprises a generic
execution model for separation kernels and an event specification for ARINC 653.
We introduce two security domains: a scheduler and a message transmitter, and
their security policies according to the characteristics of scheduling and IPC of sep-
aration kernels. The event specification models all IPC services defined in ARINC
653 (Section 3).
2. We define a set of information flow security properties and an inference framework
to sketch out the implications between security properties. We provide the security
proofs to indicate information flow security of the specification (Section 4).
3. We find some security flaws, i.e., covert channels to leak information, in the ARINC
653 standard when proving our original specification that is completely compliant
with ARINC 653, and fix them by a redesign of the specification. We also vali-
date the existence of the security flaws in two open-source ARINC 653 compliant
separation kernels, i.e., XtratuM and POK [10]. The cost of this work is in total 8
person-months (Section 5).
2 Challenges and Approach Overview
This section introduces the challenges in this work and the overview of our approach.
Challenges The challenges of this work are as follows.
1. High complexity of the ARINC 653 standard: the standard specifies the system func-
tionality of separation kernels using more than 40 pages of informal descriptions
and standardized services using more than 60 pages. As the core part for channel-
based communication, the IPC takes more than 20 pages and defines a compli-
cated communication mechanism including queuing and sampling modes, channel
buffers and port control.
2. Enormous efforts needed by formal verification of information flow security: As a
sort of hyperproperties [6], it is difficult to automatically verify information flow
security on separation kernels so far and formal verification needs an exhausting ef-
fort. There exist different sorts of information flow security (e.g., in [27,28,23,20])
and relationship of them on ARINC 653 separation kernels has to be clarified for
security assurance and certification to reduce the verification effort.
3 The complete specification and proofs are available at
http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/home/ywzhao/xkernel.htm
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the Target System
Analysis of the Target System In order to address Challenge 1, we are more concerned
on basic functionalities of separation kernels and reduce components not related to in-
formation flow security, such as hardware interface in ARINC 653. ARINC 653 uses
the inter-partition flow policy [15] in which communication ports and channels are as-
sociated with partitions, and all processes in a partition can access the ports configured
for this partition. Moreover, some hypervisor based separation kernels, such as Xtra-
tuM, manage partitions, but processes in a partition are invisible to the kernel. Thus, we
omit the concept of “process” and intra-partition communication between processes in
ARINC 653 in the formal specification. The target system to be formally specified and
verified is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Since the latest version of ARINC 653 [5] is targeted at single-core processing en-
vironments, our work considers single-core separation kernels and assumes there is no
in-kernel concurrency as the same as in [19]. Many separation kernel implementations
only allow blocking partitions by means of invoking a “partition management” hyper-
call, we prohibit blocking partitions in communication events.
Analysis of Information Flow Security Traditionally, language-based information
flow security [28] handles only two-level domain: High and Low. The data of pro-
grams are assigned either High or Low labels. Security hereby means that variations of
High-level data should not cause a variation of Low-level data. When verifying infor-
mation flow security of separation kernels, the only available information is the set of
configured partitions, local configurations of partitions, and the set of possible events
(hypercalls) partitions can invoke. There is not any concrete information about private
data of partitions. Thus, it is not possible to classify the data as High or Low. Moreover,
the inter-partition flow policy of ARINC 653 is an intransitive policy [27], which cannot
be addressed by traditional language-based information flow security. This problem is
solved in [27], where noninterference is defined following a state-event based approach
that considers intransitivity. In order to clarify different definitions on separation ker-
nels, we formalize language-based information flow security in a state-event style and
reason about the relationship of them.
Traditional formulations in the state-event based approach for information flow se-
curity assume a static mapping from actions to domains, such that the domain of an ac-
tion can be determined solely from the action itself [27]. However, in separation kernels
4that mapping is dynamic. When a hypercall occurs, the kernel must consult the kernel
scheduler to determine which partition is currently running, and the currently running
partition is the domain of the hypercall. In our specification, we define the scheduler se-
curity domain for kernel scheduling, which cannot be interfered by any other domain to
ensure that the scheduler security domain does not leak information via its scheduling
decisions. Since ARINC 653 only defines the channel-based communication services
using ports and leaves the implementation of message transmission on channels to un-
derlying separation kernels, we define the message transmitter security domain, for
message transmission. The transmitter also decouples message transmission from the
scheduler to ensure that the scheduler is not interfered by partitions.
Analysis of the Specification and Verification Approach Since separation kernels
usually support the deployment of partitions which are unknown in advance, it is well
suited to use logical reasoning by induction for formal verification. By following the
successful experiences of applying Isabelle/HOL in seL4 [19] and PikeOS [31,32], we
use Isabelle/HOL in this work.
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Fig. 2. Verification Overview
The verification overview of our work is
briefly shown in Fig. 2. In order to simplify the
verification, we decompose the specification into
two parts: an execution model for separation ker-
nels with channel-based communication and an
event specification for ARINC 653. The execu-
tion model defines basic components and a state
machine of separation kernels. The event spec-
ification uses Isabelle/HOL functions to define
the state changes when an event occurs. These
concrete functions are invoked by the execution
model. This decomposition leads to two-step proofs of information flow security. We
first define a set of information flow security properties and provide an inference frame-
work for them on the execution model. In the second step, we define a set of concrete
unwinding conditions on the concrete functions. Satisfaction of the concrete unwinding
conditions implies that the events satisfy the classical unwinding conditions, and thus
shows information flow security of our specification. The decomposition of the specifi-
cation and its proofs improves their reusability for subsequent specification refinement
and development of implementations, and thus reduces the verification effort.
3 Formal Specification
In this section, we first introduce the kernel execution model including basic compo-
nents and state-based kernel execution. Then, we present the event specification. Fi-
nally, we discuss the correctness of the formal specification.
3.1 Basic Components
According to Fig. 1, basic components include security domains, security policies and
communication components. All these components are statically configured in ARINC
653 compliant separation kernels.
5Security Domains and Policies As illustrated in bold and underlined in Fig. 1, the
security domains are the scheduler, the transmitter, and the defined partitions. In order
to discuss information flow policy, we assume a reflexive relation; that specifies the
allowable information flows between domains. If there is a channel from a partition a
to a partition b, then a ; transmitter and transmitter ; b since we use the
transmitter as the message intermediator. Since the scheduler can possibly schedule
any domain, we define in the security policy that scheduler ; d for any domain
d. The noninterference relation \; is the complement relation of ; that asserts no
information flow outside of;.
Communication Components As illustrated in Fig. 1, IPC is conducted via messages
on channels, which are defined by an abstract type Message. Partitions have access
to channels via ports which are the endpoints of channels. A channel links partitions
and is a logical link between one source port and one or more destination ports. It also
specifies the mode of transferring messages, which can be queuing or sampling mode.
The datatype Channel_Type and Port_Type define these two components.
System Configuration A significant characteristic of ARINC 653 compliant separa-
tion kernels is that partitions, policies and communication components are statically
configured at built-time.
In our specification, we use record Sys_Config to define the system configuration
and fixes sysconf :: "Sys_Config" as a constant in the specification.
3.2 State-based Kernel Execution
Event and State We consider four types of events: hypercalls, system events, excep-
tions, and actions in partitions. Hypercalls cover all IPC services in ARINC 653. Sys-
tem events are the actions of the kernel itself and include kernel initialization, schedul-
ing and message transmission. The other two types are abstract events that can be re-
fined in a concrete specification. Events are illustrated in Fig. 1 as dotted line arrows
and italics. Since there is no in-kernel concurrency, all these events execute atomically.
It is not that all events are enabled in a state. We use a function event enabled
to indicate whether an event can execute in a state. The function exec event executes
an event in a state and changes the state when it is enabled. In the event specification,
we define functions to implement concrete communication, scheduling and message
transmission. The exec event function here invokes the concrete functions.
The state is defined as record State, which consists of information about the cur-
rent running partition, partition states, communication states, created ports and current
value of local variables in domains. For a state s::State and a sequence of events as,
execute as s denotes the final state reached by executing as from s.
Domain of Events Events have their own execution domains. The domain of the sys-
tem events is static: the domain of the event scheduling is the scheduler; the domain of
message transmission is the transmitter. On the other hand, the domain of hypercalls is
dynamic and dependent on the current state of the kernel, defined as domain_of_event
s (hyperc h) = current s, where current s returns the currently running parti-
tion in the state s.
6State Reachability Since not all events are enabled in a state, some states in the type
State are not reachable from the initial state s0. Let reachable s ≡ ∃as. s =
execute as s0 denote that the state s is reachable from the initial state s0. According
to the definition of reachable and execute, we have reachable s0 and Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. ∀s as. reachable s ∧ s’ = execute as s −→ reachable s’
State Equivalence A key concept for information flow security is that states are iden-
tical for a security domain. We define an equivalence relation ∼ d ∼ on states for each
domain d such that s ∼ d ∼ t if and only if states s and t are identical for domain d,
that is to say states s and t are indistinguishable for domain d. For a set of domains D,
we define s ≈ D ≈ t ≡ ∀d ∈ D. s ∼ d ∼ t.
For a partition d, s ∼ d ∼ t if and only if vpeq part s d t, where
vpeq_part s d t ≡ vpeq_vars s (the ((domv sysconf) d)) t
∧ (partitions s) d = (partitions t) d ∧ vpeq_part_comm s d t
It means that states s and t are equivalent for a partition d, when values of local
variables, partition state, and communication abilities of d on these two states are the
same. An example of the communication ability is that if a destination queuing port
p is not empty in two states s and t, a partition d has the same ability on p in s as
in t, because d has the ability to receive a message from p in these two states. The
equivalence of communication abilities defines that partition d has the same set of ports,
and that the number of messages is the same for all destination ports on states s and t.
Two states s and t are equivalent for the scheduler when the values of local vari-
ables of the scheduler and the current running partition on the two states are the same.
The equivalence of states for the transmitter requires that all ports, states of the ports
and values of local variable are the same.
3.3 Event Specification
The event specification defines the concrete functions to implement the execution of
events. The functionalities of separation kernels in this paper include kernel initializa-
tion, scheduling, message transmission and hypercalls. The kernel initialization consid-
ers initialization of the kernel state. Since our specification does not define processes,
we only consider the partition scheduling rather than the two-level scheduling on parti-
tion and process levels in ARINC 653. Because the execution of message transmission
is also under the control of scheduling, we define an abstract partition scheduling that
non-deterministically chooses one partition or the transmitter as the currently executing
domain.
This subsection mainly discusses channel-based communication services in AR-
INC 653 and the message transmission. All events and their descriptions in the event
specification are shown in Table 1.
Channel-based Communication Services ARINC 653 specifies the behavior of ports
and the communication services via ports in detail. Programs in a partition could use
IPC by invoking these services. ARINC 653 defines eleven services for sampling and
queuing ports (No. 1 ∼ 11 in Table 1). The communication architecture is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
7Table 1. Events in Our Specification
No. Name Description of Event Specification
Hypercalls
(1) Create Sampling Port Create a sampling port. An identifier is assigned by the kernel and returned.
(2) Write Sampling Message Write a message in the specified sampling port. The message overwrites the pre-
vious one.
(3) Read Sampling Message Read a message from the specified sampling port.
(4) Get Sampling Portid Return the sampling port identifier that corresponds to a sampling port name.
(5) Get Sampling Portstatus Return the current status of the specified sampling port.
(6) Create Queuing Port Create a queuing port. An identifier is assigned by the kernel and returned.
(7) Send Queuing Message Send a message in the specified queuing port. If there is sufficient space in the
queuing port to accept the message, the message is inserted into the port buffer. If
there is insufficient space, the message is lost.
(8) Receive Queuing Message Receive a message from the specified queuing port. If the queuing port is not
empty, a message in the port buffer is removed and returned. If the queuing port
is empty, None is returned.
(9) Get Queuing Portid Return the queuing port identifier that corresponds to a queuing port name.
(10) Get Queuing Portstatus Return the current status of the specified queuing port.
(11) Clear Queuing Port Discard any messages in the message buffer of the specified destination port.
System events
(12) Schedule Set one partition or the transmitter as the currently running domain.
(13) Transfer Sampling Message Copy the message in the source sampling port to all destination sampling ports of
a sampling channel, if all ports of this channel have been created.
(14) Transfer Queuing Message Copy a message in the source queuing port to the destination queuing port of a
queuing channel and remove the message from the source port, if the two ports of
this channel have been created and the source port is not empty. If the destination
port is full, the message is lost.
(15) Init Initialize the kernel state using the system configuration.
In the first stage of this work, we design the event specification completely based
on the service behavior specified in ARINC 653. When proving the unwinding condi-
tions on these events, we find covert channels (Section 5 in detail) and change the ser-
vice specification defined in ARINC 653 to avoid these covert channels. McCullough
[17] provides three ways to avoid covert channels: unbounded buffer, process blocking
and message loss. According to the discussion in Section 2, we do not allow partition
blocking in communication services. Because unbounded buffer would lead to a bigger
problem of denial of service (DoS), the feasible way for our specification is to allow
message loss. In order to avoid covert channels, we allow message loss when sending a
message to a queuing port and transmitting a message in a queuing channel.
We use a set of functions to implement one service. For instance, the Send Queuing
Message service is implemented by function send queuing message maylost as
follows and a set of related functions invoked by this function.
definition send_queuing_message_maylost :: "Sys_Config ⇒ State ⇒ port_id ⇒
Message ⇒ (State × bool)" where
"send_queuing_message_maylost sc s p m ≡
(if(¬ is_a_queuingport s p ∨ ¬ is_source_port s p
∨ ¬ is_a_port_of_partition s p ) then (s, False)
else if is_full_portqueuing sc s p then (s, True)
else (insert_msg2queuing_port s p m, True))"
As specified in the Send Queuing Message service in ARINC 653, when sending
a message via a queuing port, it fails if either the specified port does not exist, or it is not
a source port, or it is not in current partition. When the port is full, the calling process
is blocked. Since blocking is not considered in this paper, we just discard the message.
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Message Transmission on Channels ARINC 653 does not define the functionalities of
message transmission and leaves its implementation to underlying separation kernels.
We design a basic specification of the message transmission in this paper.
The message transmission on channels is shown in Fig. 3. ARINC 653 has two
modes of channel-based communication: sampling and queuing mode. The multicast
message that is sent from a single source to more than one destination is supported
in sampling mode. The queuing mode only supports the unicast message. In sampling
mode, a message transmission on a channel copies the message in the source sampling
port of the channel to the buffers of all destination sampling ports of the channel. Whilst
in queuing mode, a message transmission on a channel copies a message in the buffer
of the source queuing port, removes it from this buffer and stores the message into the
buffer of the destination queuing port of the channel. When the buffer of the destination
queuing port is full, the message is discarded.
For instance, the message transmission in queuing mode is defined as follows. If the
source and destination port have been created and there are messages in the buffer of
the source port, a message in the buffer is removed and inserted into the buffer of the
destination port. When the buffer of the destination port is full, the message is discarded.
primrec transf_queuing_msg_maylost :: "Sys_Config ⇒ State ⇒ Channel_Type
⇒ State" where
"transf_queuing_msg_maylost sc s (Channel_Queuing _ sn dn) =
(let sp = get_portid_by_name s sn; dp = get_portid_by_name s dn in
if sp 6= None ∧ dp 6= None ∧ has_msg_inportqueuing s (the sp) then
let sm = remove_msg_from_queuingport s (the sp) in
if is_full_portqueuing sc (fst sm) (the dp) then s
else
insert_msg2queuing_port (fst sm) (the dp) (the (snd sm))
else s )" |
"transf_queuing_msg_maylost sc s (Channel_Sampling _ _ _) = s"
3.4 Correctness of Formal Specification
To assure the correctness of our specification, beside the manual validation by inspect-
ing the Isabelle/HOL specification, we prove that functionalities of the specified ser-
9vices are correct w.r.t. the ARINC 653 informal description [5] by means of 33 lemmas
for events and invariants. Due to the atomicity of event execution, the correctness of
an event can be specified and proved by pre- and post-conditions of the event in Hoare
logic [14], i.e., {P} C {Q}, where C is the Isabelle function implementing the event,
P and Q are the pre- and post-conditions respectively. Since the execution of events
always terminate, our specification is a total correctness specification. Termination is
ensured by using the primrec and definition in Isabelle/HOL to define the functions in
our specification and proved automatically in Isabelle/HOL. For instance, the correct-
ness lemma for the event Create Sampling Port is as follows. The pre-condition is
that the port named p is configured, has not been created and is a port of the currently
running partition. Under the pre-condition, the execution of create_sampling _port
returns a pair of the new state and the assigned identifier of the created port. The post-
condition ensures that the identifier (the (snd r)) is stored in the ports in the new
state (ports (comm (fst r))).
Lemma 2 (Correctness of Create Sampling Port).
{ get_samplingport_conf sysconf p 6= None ∧ get_portid_by_name s p = None ∧
p ∈ get_partition_cfg_ports_byid sysconf (current s) }
r = create_sampling_port sysconf s p
{ (ports (comm (fst r))) (the (snd r)) 6= None }
Functional correctness requires to prove invariants on the data structures defining
the state. An invariant is a safety property and defined on states as a predicate ψ s.
It is preserved in all reachable states by proving the invariant theorem: reachable s
=⇒ ψ s. A typical invariant is the predicate port consistent s. We use a set to
store created ports. The port state (e.g., the messages currently in the port) is defined
as Ports = "port_id ⇀ Port_Type". Ports belong to different partitions that is
defined as part_ports :: "port_id ⇀ partition_id". The port consistent
s requires that the created port set and the domains of these two partial functions are the
same in any reachable states. The invariant theorem is proved by Lemma 1 and other
two lemmas: (1) ψ s0 and (2) ∀s as. ψ s ∧ s’ = execute as s −→ ψ s’.
4 Information Flow Security and Proofs
This section first presents a set of information flow security properties defined on the
execution model, which includes the original definitions of noninterference [27], non-
leakage [23] and noninfluence [23], and their variants. Nonleakage is language-based
information flow security and noninfluence is the combination of noninterference and
nonleakage. Then, we present an overview of our proof structure and the proofs which
include an inference framework of these properties and the security proofs of our event
specification.
4.1 Formalizing Noninterference
Since intransitive policies could be used to specify channel control policies [27], we
consider intransitive noninterference in this paper. The essence of noninterference on
separation kernels is that a partition d cannot distinguish the final states between exe-
cuting a sequence of events as and executing its purged sequence from the initial state.
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In the purged sequence, the events of partitions that are not allowed to pass information
to d directly or indirectly are removed.
In order to express the allowed information flow for intransitive policies, we employ
the function sources [27], which takes a sequence of events as and a target domain
d and yields the set of domains that are allowed to pass information to d when as
occurs. Due to the dependency of event domains on states, the sources function in our
specification depends on the current state s. The sources function is used to define the
classical purge function, ipurge, in terms of which security properties are formulated.
The ipurge as s d yields the sequence of events as, where all events that are not
allowed to pass information to d directly or indirectly when as is executed from s are
removed.
We use the abbreviation s / as ∼= t / bs @ d for the observational equiva-
lence. It denotes that d is identical in the two final states after executing as from s
(by execute as s) and executing bs from t. Traditionally, this equivalence is defined
using a projection function output which returns the observed results on a state by a
domain. In this paper, we have combined the output in the state equivalence presented
in Subsection 3.2. This allows us to avoid the unwinding condition of output consistent.
We define the classical nontransitive noninterference [27] on our execution model as
follows.
noninterference ≡ ∀d as. (s0  as ∼= s0  (ipurge as s0 d) @ d)
In the definition of noninterference, the ipurge function only deletes all unsuitable
events. A strong version of noninterference is introduced in [23] to handle arbitrary
insertion and deletion of secret events. Oheimb [23] says that the strong noninterfer-
ence and the original one are equivalent in deterministic cases. We define this strong
version of noninterference on the execution model as weak_noninterference, since
noninterference implies weak noninterference on our execution model.
The above definitions of noninterference are based on the initial state s0, but sepa-
ration kernels usually support warm or cold start and they may start to execute from a
non-initial state. Therefore, we define a more general version of noninterference as fol-
lows based on the reachable function. This general noninterference requires that the
system starting from any reachable state is secure. It is obvious that this noninterference
implies the classical noninterference due to the lemma: reachable s0.
noninterference_r ≡ ∀d as s. reachable s −→
(s  as ∼= s  (ipurge as s d) @ d)
4.2 Formalizing Nonleakage and Noninfluence
Language-based information flow security is generalized to arbitrary multi-domain poli-
cies in [23] as a new notion nonleakage. Nonleakage and noninterference are also com-
bined in [23] as a new notion noninfluence. Murray et al. [20] have extended the original
definition of nonleakage and noninfluence and defined the general forms of them for op-
erating systems based on the scheduler. We use Murray’s definitions and define them
on our execution model as follows.
nonleakage ≡ ∀d as s t. reachable s ∧ reachable t −→
(s ∼ (scheduler sysconf) ∼ t) −→ (s ≈ (sources as s d) ≈ t)
−→ (s  as ∼= t  as @ d)
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Fig. 4. Proof Structure
noninfluence ≡ ∀ d as bs s t . reachable s ∧ reachable t −→
(s ≈ (sources as s d) ≈ t) −→ (s ∼ (scheduler sysconf) ∼ t) −→
ipurge as s d = ipurge bs s d −→ (s  as ∼= t  bs @ d)
The intuitive meaning of nonleakage is that if the secret data is not leaked initially,
the secret data should not be leaked during executing a sequence of events. Separation
kernels are said to preserve nonleakage when for any pair of reachable states s and t
and observing domain d, if (1) s and t are equivalent for all domains that may (directly
or indirectly) interfere with d during the run of as, i.e., s ≈ (sources as s d) ≈
t, and (2) the same domain is currently running in both states, i.e., s ∼ (scheduler
sysconf) ∼ t, then s and t are observationally equivalent for d when executing as.
Murray’s definition of noninfluence is a weak one, we propose a strong one according to
the Oheimb’s noninfluence by extending the scheduler and state reachability as follows.
strong_noninfluence ≡ ∀ d as s t . reachable s ∧ reachable t −→
(s ≈ (sources as s d) ≈ t) −→ (s ∼ (scheduler sysconf) ∼ t)
−→ (s  as ∼= t  (ipurge as t d) @ d)
4.3 Proof Structure
As discussed in Section 2, proofs of information flow security on our specification com-
prise two parts: an inference framework of information flow security properties on the
execution model and security proofs of the event specification. The proof structure of
this work is shown in Fig. 4, where an arrow means the implication between properties.
In the next two subsections, we discuss the two parts of proofs in turn.
4.4 Inference Framework of Information Flow Security
In order to clarify different properties of information flow security on our specification,
we provide an inference framework on the execution model as shown in the lower part
of Fig. 4. We have proven all implication relations between these properties on the ex-
ecution model. We could see that the property strong noninfluence is the strongest
one and if this property is satisfied, so are all other properties.
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The standard proof of information flow security properties is discharged by proving
a set of unwinding conditions [27] that examine individual execution steps of the sys-
tem. Our work follows this approach. In order to prove strong noninfluence, we de-
fine two general unwinding conditions, weak step consistent and local respect,
as follows. As there is no output function in our specification, we do not define the
classical unwinding condition of output consistent.
weak_step_consistent ≡ ∀ d a s t . reachable s ∧ reachable t −→
(s ∼ d ∼ t) ∧ (s ∼ (scheduler sysconf) ∼ t) ∧
((domain_of_event s a) ; d) ∧ (s ∼ (domain_of_event s a) ∼ t)
−→ ((exec_event s a) ∼ d ∼ (exec_event t a))
local_respect ≡ ∀ a d s s’. reachable s −→
((domain_of_event s a) \; d) ∧ (s’ = exec_event s a) −→ (s ∼ d ∼ s’)
The weak step consistent means that for any pair of reachable states s and t,
and any observing domain d, the next states after executing any event a on s and t
are indistinguishable for d, i.e., (exec_event s a) ∼ d ∼ (exec_event t a), if
s and t are indistinguishable for d, the same domain is currently running in s and
t, the domain of event a in state s can interference with d, and s and t are indis-
tinguishable for the domain of event a. The weak step consistent is the same as
confidentiality-u proposed in [20]. The local respect is the same as integrity-
u in [20], which means that an event a that executes in some state s can affect only those
domains to which the domain executing event a is allowed to send information.
4.5 Security Proofs of Event Specification
The second step of proofs is to show security of the event specification. From definitions
of the two general unwinding conditions, we could see that in order to prove the satis-
faction of the two conditions on our specification, we can induct on each type of events
in separation kernels and prove that each concrete event satisfies the two conditions.
Therefore, we define a set of concrete unwinding conditions for all events. Satisfaction
of the concrete unwinding conditions of one event implies that the event satisfies the
general unwinding conditions. For instance, Lemma 3 and 4 show the concrete unwind-
ing conditions for event Create Queuing Port.
Lemma 3 (Local respect of creating queuing port).
reachable s ∧ is_a_partition sysconf (current s) ∧ (current s) \; d ∧
s’ = fst (create_queuing_port sysconf s pname) =⇒ s ∼ d ∼ s’
Lemma 4 (Weak step consistent of creating queuing port).
is_a_partition sysconf (current s) ∧ reachable s ∧ reachable t ∧
s ∼ d ∼ t ∧ s ∼ (scheduler sysconf) ∼ t ∧ (current s) ; d ∧
s ∼ (current s) ∼ t ∧ s’ = fst (create_queuing_port sysconf s pname) ∧
t’ = fst (create_queuing_port sysconf t pname) =⇒ s’ ∼ d ∼ t’
Finally, we conclude the satisfaction of strong noninfluence on our specifica-
tion and all other information flow security properties according to the inference frame-
work.
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Table 2. Specification and Proofs Statistics
Specification Proofs
Item # of function/definition LOC PM Item
# of lemma
/theorem LOP PM
Execution model 32 ∼ 200
2
Inference Framework 61 ∼ 1000
6Event Specification 68 ∼ 800 Correctness 33 ∼ 6000Security 123
Total 100 ∼ 1000 2 Total 217 ∼ 7000 6
5 Results and Discussion
Evaluation We use Isabelle/HOL as the specification and verification system for sep-
aration kernels. The proofs of information flow security in our specification are con-
ducted in the structured proof language Isar in Isabelle, allowing for proof text natu-
rally understandable for both humans and computers. All derivations of our proofs have
passed through the Isabelle proof kernel.
The statistics for the effort and size of the specification and proofs are shown in
Table 2. We use 100 functions/definitions and ∼ 1000 lines of code (LOC) of Is-
abelle/HOL to specify the execution model and event specification. 217 lemmas/theorems
in Isabelle/HOL are proved using ∼ 7000 lines of proof (LOP) of Isar to ensure the in-
formation flow security of our specification. The work is carried out by a total effort of
roughly 8 person-months (PM).
Validating and Fixing Covert Channels in ARINC 653 When proving the satisfac-
tion of unwinding conditions on the events, we find some security flaws, i.e., covert
channels to leak information, in ARINC 653.
Covert Channel 1: queuing mode channel-based communication. If there is a queu-
ing mode channel from partition a to b and no other channels exist, then it is se-
cure that a ; transmitter, transmitter ; b, transmitter \; a and b \;
transmitter. In fact, these security policies are violated in ARINC 653. Firstly, when
a sends a message by invoking Send Queuing Message service of ARINC 653, the
service returns NOT AVAILABLE or TIMED OUT when the buffer is full, and returns NO
ERROR when the buffer is not full. However, the full/empty status of the buffer in the
port can be changed by message transmission executed by the transmitter. Thus, the
local respect property is not preserved on Send Queuing Message service, and
transmitter \; a is violated. Secondly, due to no message loss required by AR-
INC 653, the transmitter cannot transmit a message on a channel when the destination
queuing port is full. However, the full status of the destination port can be changed
by Receive Queuing Message service executed by partition b. Thus, the local
respect property is not preserved on the event of message transmission, and b \;
transmitter is violated. To avoid this covert channel, we allow message loss when
sending messages to a queuing port or transmitting message on a queuing mode chan-
nel.
Covert Channel 2: Create Sampling Port and Create Queuing Port services. This
is a potential covert channel. It is dependent on the concrete implementation of AR-
INC 653 and can be avoided by careful designs. In ARINC 653, the service Create
Sampling Port and Create Queuing Port create a port and return a new unique
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identifier assigned by the kernel to the new port. In the initial specification, we use a
natural number to maintain this new identifier. This number is initially assigned to one
and increased by one after each port creation. We find in this design that the number be-
comes a covert channel that can flow information from any partition to another, and the
two events do not preserve the weak step consistent property. This covert channel
can be avoided by assigning the port identifier to each port during system initialization
or in the system configuration.
Validating and Fixing Covert Channels in Open-source Implementations We have
manually validated the found covert channels in two open-source separation kernels,
i.e., XtratuM and POK. Covert channels are found when we validate these two imple-
mentations.
The version of XtratuM we validate is v3.7.3 for SPARC v8 architecture. Unlike
that there is one buffer for each queuing port in ARINC 653, XtratuM uses one shared
buffer between the source port and the destination port of a queuing mode channel as a
transmitter. If the buffer is not full, the hypercall SendQueuingPort inserts the message
into the buffer and notifies the receiver; whilst if the buffer is full, SendQueuingPort
immediately returns XM OP NOT ALLOWED. The hypercall ReceiveQueuingPort has
a similar design. Thus, the found covert channel 1 exists in XtratuM. The way to avoid
this security flaw is to redesign the hypercall SendQueuingPort to lose the message and
return XM OK when the buffer is full.
The version of POK we validate is the latest one released in 2014. Different from
XtratuM, POK has a transmitter to transfer messages from a source port to a destination
port of a channel. POK blocks processes to wait for resources. If the buffer is not full, the
syscall pok port queueing send inserts the message into the buffer; whilst if the buffer
is full and timeout = 0, it immediately returns POK ERRNO FULL. pok port transfer
responds for transmitting messages from a source port to a destination one and returns
POK ERRNO SIZE when the destination port has no available space to store messages.
Thus, the found covert channel 1 exists in POK. The way to avoid this security flaw is
to allow message loss or block the calling process until the port buffer is not full in the
syscall pok port queueing send.
When creating a port, XtratuM and POK use the index of the port in the port array
as the new identifier. Thus, they do not have the covert channel 2.
Discussion The reusability of formal specification and proofs can largely alleviate the
enormous efforts needed when others enforce information flow security on separation
kernels. Our formal specification can be refined to the concrete specification of separa-
tion kernels. In the concrete specification, new variables and events may be introduced
and some events in this paper may be refined. The state equivalence in our specification
is sufficient for the abstract and concrete specification of the channel-based commu-
nication. Therefore, the new variables in the concrete specification do not change the
definition of state equivalence, and thus the new variables and new events manipulating
these variables do not break the information flow security of the concrete specification.
Information flow security properties in this paper can be preserved on refinement of
events of the channel-based communication according to the conclusion in [20]. Due
to the reusability of the formal specification, the inference framework and the security
proofs in this work are also reusable for the concrete specification.
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6 Related Work and Conclusions
Information Flow Security Information flow security [28] has attracted many research
efforts in recent years. State-event based noninterference [27] is usually chosen for ver-
ifying general purpose operating systems and separation kernels [20]. Language-based
information flow security was generalized to arbitrary multi-domain policies in [23] as
a new state-event based notion nonleakage. Oheimb [23] also combined the classical
noninterference and nonleakage as the notion noninfluence. These properties have been
instantiated for operating systems in [20] and formally verified on seL4 [19]. In our
work, all of these properties and their variants are defined in our specification. We also
propose an inference framework to clarify the implications between these properties.
Formal Specification and Verification of Separation Kernels Formal methods have
been widely applied on separation kernels in recent years [8,30,31,32,13,25,33,12,19,9,29].
An overview is available in [34]. An Isabelle/HOL specification for a generic separa-
tion kernel was published by EURO-MILS project [31]. They provided an abstraction
specification for Controlled Interruptible Separation Kernels (CISK), instantiated it to
a separation kernel model, and then applied them on the PikeOS separation kernel [32].
The Isabelle/HOL specification of seL4 was extended to a separation kernel specifica-
tion in [19]. Formal specification in our work provides a detailed model for ARINC
653 channel-based communication, which is not covered in related work. In particular,
there is no concrete communication actions in specification of [31]. The IPC syscalls in
seL4 [19] and PikeOS [32] are very different from ARINC 653 channel-based commu-
nication.
Formalization and Verification of ARINC 653 Formalization and verification of AR-
INC 653 have been considered in recent years, such as formal specification of ARINC
653 architecture [24], modeling ARINC 653 for model driven development of IMA
applications [11], and verification of application software on top of ARINC 653 [7].
In [35], the system functionalities and all service requirements in ARINC 653 have
been formalized in Event-B, and some inconsistencies have been found in the standard.
These works aim at safety of separation kernels or applications. Our work is the first to
conduct a formal security analysis of the ARINC 653 standard.
Conclusions and Future Work The long-term goal of our project is to verify security
of separation kernels on source code level. In this paper, we presented a case study of ap-
plying Isabelle/HOL to formally specify and verify separation kernels with ARINC 653
channel-based communication. We provided a formal specification with mechanically
checked proofs that is totally free of covert channels and therefore provided informa-
tion flow security for high assurance systems. We revealed covert channels in ARINC
653 and validated their existence in XtratuM and POK. Our specification is reusable for
subsequent specification refinement and development of implementations. The proofs
in this work can alleviate the verification efforts on information flow security. In the next
step, we will develop a formal specification of separation kernels supporting multi-core
and the specification in this paper will be revised. Due to the kernel concurrency be-
tween cores, we will find a feasible way to verify multi-core separation kernels.
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